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“Is Offense Worth More than Defense in the National Basketball Association?”

Abstract
Motivated by the popular sports saying, “Offense sells tickets, defense wins championships,” we
use Forbes revenue data to quantify whether offense really does sell more ‘tickets’ than defense
in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Employing team offensive and defensive win
shares as measures of offensive and defensive proficiency, we find offensively oriented teams
generate the same amount of revenue as do defensively oriented teams, other things equal. Our
results suggest that both profit-maximizing and win-maximizing teams should value offensively
and defensively players equivalently (per unit). Thus, in an efficient free agent market, we
would expect equilibrium player salaries for offensive and defensive production to be
statistically equal (per unit). Coupled with recent findings that NBA teams pay players
significantly more for offensive production than for defensive production (Ehrlich, Sanders and
Boudreaux 2019), our current results indicate the existence of disequilibrium in the NBA free
agent market. In an additional test of fan preferences, we transform existing Forbes revenue data
into pre-revenue sharing revenue estimates based on the NBA’s current pool plan. Econometric
results based on pre-revenue sharing revenue data provide further evidence that fans do not
prefer offense to defense.
Keywords: Productivity, Revenue, Basketball, Offense, Defense

“Is Offense Worth More than Defense in the National Basketball Association?”

1. Introduction
There is an ongoing discussion whether teams maximize profits or wins. A number of
theoretical researchers assume the possible existence of both types [Dietl et al. 2009; Kesenne
2004; Kesenne and Pauwels 2006; Zimbalist 2003]. Leeds et al. (2018, 57-58) cite the NBA’s
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban as a prime example of a ‘win-maximizer,’ while labeling
the Toronto Raptors ownership group as probable ‘profit-maximizers.’ More realistically, each
team likely lies along a spectrum ranging from pure profit-maximization to pure winmaximization.
Since a point scored on offense carries approximately the same value (in terms of wins) as a
point denied on defense, Ehrlich et al. (2019) correctly contend that win-maximizing NBA teams
should value offense and defense equally (on average) on the free agent market. However, they
find NBA teams pay players roughly 150% more for offensive production (per unit) compared to
defensive production (per unit).1 Given the NBA’s salary cap, they posit a win-maximizing team
could engage in arbitrage by choosing relatively underpaid defensive-oriented free agents. In
other words, by choosing defensive-oriented players, a team could increase their wins per dollar
spent.
In view of the Ehrlich et al (2019) findings, our current study recognizes that if teams are
primarily profit-maximizing, the observed salary premium might exist because offense is worth
more in terms of revenue generation; given the popular sports saying, “Offense sells tickets,
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In a study of Major League Baseball (MLB) position players, Ehrlich et al (2020) find that
MLB free agents are also paid a premium for offensive production.

defense wins championships,” we quantify whether offense really does sell more ‘tickets’ than
defense in the NBA.2 Since basketball highlights on television “almost exclusively show replays
of thunderous dunks, flashy feeds and deep triples [Fromal, 2015],” then we contend it is
certainly plausible that fans prefer offense to defense. That is, the revenue generated from an
additional unit of offensive production might exceed the revenue generated from an additional
unit of defensive production. In this scenario, profit-maximizing teams would be correct to pay
more for offensive production, and only win-maximizers would be able to engage in arbitrage [as
outlined by Ehrlich et al. (2019)].
Using team offensive and defensive win shares, we estimate the marginal revenue products
(i.e. values) of offensive and defensive wins. We then test whether the marginal revenue product
of an offensive win exceeds the marginal revenue product of a defensive win. By testing whether
offense is truly worth more than defense, our study seeks to determine whether profitmaximizing teams are justified in paying a premium for offense. Importantly, if a defensive win
were to carry the same worth (in terms of revenue generation) as an offensive win, then a salary
premium paid for offensively oriented players would reveal that 1) arbitrage opportunities would
exist for a team if they were win-maximizing or profit-maximizing, and 2) there would be
disequilibrium in the NBA labor market.
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In a couple of papers examining on field performance, Gambarelli et al (2019) investigate the
decision of soccer coaches in choosing an ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive’ strategy in soccer, while
Robst et al (2011) find that defense is not more than offense in explaining winning in the
National Football League. Ehrlich and Potter (2020) demonstrate that MLB fans do not have a
preference for offense.

In an additional test of fan preferences, we transform (existing) post-revenue sharing revenue
data to pre-revenue sharing revenue data for each team. Using these pre-revenue sharing revenue
estimates, we also calculate the marginal revenue products (i.e. values) of offensive and
defensive wins prior to revenue sharing, thereby obtaining a truer estimate of fan preferences,
since the noise associated with revenue sharing is thereby reduced.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the use of team
offensive and defensive win shares. Section 3 details the data, econometric modeling, and
primary results. Section 4 explains how pre-revenue sharing revenue is calculated and estimates
regressions with pre-revenue sharing revenue as the dependent variable. Section 5 concludes.

2. Team Win Shares
We model team offensive and defensive production in terms of win shares; these measures
are quite attractive for three major reasons. First, they are highly predictive of actual winning
(as we demonstrate later in this section). Second, they are very highly correlated with the team
performance metrics known as offensive and defensive ratings (we demonstrate these
correlations later in this section as well). Third, team offensive and defensive win shares are
quite intuitive since they measure team ability in terms of team wins; hence, the value of
offensive (defensive) wins can be directly compared to the value of actual team wins (as we
demonstrate in section 3).
Offensive win shares and defensive win shares are calculated independently. These metrics
were developed by the founder of Basketball Reference, Jason Kubatko [Casciaro, 2014], and are
based on the work of Dean Oliver (2004). A number of sports economics researchers have also
used player win shares in their analyses [e.g. Hoffer and Freide, 2014; Burdekin and Van, 2018;

Evans, 2018; Humphreys and Johnson, 2020]. A player’s season offensive (defensive) win share
total provides an estimate of how many wins that player contributed to their team on offense
(defense). For example, the 2017-18 MVP, James Harden, had 11.6 offensive win shares and 3.8
defensive win shares. In other words, he produced 15.4 wins for his team (11.6 offensive wins
and 3.8 defensive wins).
Team offensive and defensive win shares are also attractive for a number of practical
considerations. First, both measures are calculated for each NBA player and published on
basketballreference.com. Second, these data are freely available to academic researchers. Third,
even if a player changed teams mid-season, their win share totals for each team are specified;
hence, by summing all player win shares from each team we can calculate team win shares for
both offense and defense.3 Finally, once offensive and defensive marginal revenue product
estimates are obtained, it is straightforward to estimate the entire marginal revenue product for a
given player with the following stylized marginal revenue product equation:
1) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 = 𝑂𝑊𝑆 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 + 𝐷𝑊𝑆 ∙ 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆
Where 𝑂𝑊𝑆 (𝐷𝑊𝑆) is the offensive (defensive) win shares contributed by a given player and
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 (𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 ) is the marginal revenue product of an offensive (defensive) win. We obtain
estimates for 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 in the next section. Although our approach follows the
seminal work of Scully (1974), it is more precise since we are using an established measure of
win shares instead of a crude estimate. In this way, win shares allow researchers to more easily
estimate player marginal revenue product. For a competitive market, the standard economic

This summation approach is not available for statistics like ESPN’s adjusted real plus minus, as
it is unclear how much a player contributed to each team (if a player changed teams mid-year).
3

model reveals that players are paid equal to their marginal revenue product [see Leeds et al
(2018, 263) for a discussion].

Summary statistics for win shares are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Summary Statistics: Offensive Win Shares (OWS) and Defensive Win Shares (DWS)
OWS
DWS

Obs
180
180

Mean
21.657
20.103

St. Dev
7.996
6.516

25th
16.45
15.1

Median
21.15
20.05

75th
27.25
25

To further illustrate these distributions, the kernel density plots of team offensive and defensive
win shares are presented in figure 1. Although distributions appear similar, offensive win shares
are more dispersed than defensive win shares.

Figure 1: Kernel Density Plot: Offensive Win Shares (OWS) and Defensive Win Shares (DWS)

In order to check the robustness of offensive and defensive win shares in determining
team wins, we specify the following OLS model and accompanying hypothesis:
2) 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

Hypothesis 1: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 1. In this case, both offensive and defensive wins would have the
same statistical relationship with actual team wins. Furthermore, an additional offensive (defensive) win
would correlate one-to-one with an additional actual team win.

Table 2: OLS Regression Results with Wins as the Dependent Variable
VARIABLES
OWSi,t
DWSi,t
Constant

(1)
Model 1
1.038***
(0.0294)
1.025***
(0.0361)
-2.070**
(0.840)

Observations
180
R-squared
0.943
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Results from table 2 provide evidence that team offensive and defensive win shares are
good predictors of actual team wins. A Wald test indicates there is insufficient evidence to reject
hypothesis 1 that 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 1. The p-value of this Wald test was 0.24. These results suggest
there is a one-to-one relationship with team win share metrics (OWS and DWS) and actual wins.
In a separate robustness test, we measure the correlation between team defensive
(offensive) win shares and team defensive (offensive) ratings. Team Defensive ratings (taken
from basketballreference.com) measure the number of points allowed by a team per 100
possessions while team offensive ratings measure the number of points scored by a team per 100
possessions. Since offenses have tended to score more efficiently throughout the years of our
sample [2013-14 to 2018-19], we corrected for this scoring ‘inflation’ by adjusting both team
offensive and defensive ratings using the 2013-2014 season as the base year. The Pearson
correlation coefficient between team defensive win shares and the ‘inflation’ adjusted team
defensive ratings is -0.9995 and is statistically significant at the 0.000001 level (see figure 2 for a
visual representation). Meanwhile, the Pearson correlation coefficient between offensive win

shares and adjusted team offensive ratings is 0.9964 and is also statistically significant at the
0.000001 level (see figure 3 for a visual representation).
Figure 2: Team Defensive Win Shares and Adjusted Team Defensive Ratings

Figure 3: Team Offensive Win Shares and Adjusted Team Offensive Ratings

These results demonstrate that adjusted team defensive (offensive) ratings are essentially
a perfect substitute for team defensive (offensive) win shares in terms of quantifying team
defensive (offensive) quality. We select win shares as our productivity metric throughout the
remainder of the paper since team ‘wins’ via defense (offense) is the more intuitive metric
compared to points allowed (scored).

3. Econometric Modeling and Data
Our primary econometric specification is as follows:
3) 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

Where 𝛽1 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝛽2 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 . 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of controls [MSA income, MSA
population, new stadium indicator] and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 is a time trend. Table 5 presents the full summary
statistics.

Table 5: Summary Statistics
Revenue
GDP per capita
Population
New Stadium
DeltaWL
OWS
DWS

Obs
180
180
180
180
180
180
180

Mean
230.683
63.135
5606972
.056
0
21.657
20.103

St.Dev
71.686
13.382
4935479
.23
.13
7.996
6.516

25th
166.891
53.886
2306396
0
-.079
16.45
15.1

Median
223.205
62.111
4408933
0
.012
21.15
20.05

75th
268.847
69.196
6265219
0
.098
27.25
25

We use yearly [2013-14 to 2018-19] team revenue data collected from Forbes and adjust
for inflation using data collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We chose the sample years
to avoid complications arising from the 2011-2012 lockout and the COVID-19 shortened 201920.4 Forbes data include all team revenue generated from basketball operations (ticket sales,
merchandise, concessions, television contracts, etc.) and accounts for revenue after sharing has
taken place. We obtained real gross domestic product (by metropolitan statistical area) from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014-2018); it is reported in thousands of dollars. We obtained MSA
Population data through the U.S. Census Bureau. We added Canadian equivalents for Toronto
from StatCan, while obtaining new stadium data from the Wikipedia entry on current NBA
stadiums [‘List of National Basketball Association Arenas,’ n.d.]. New stadium is an indicator
equal to 1 when a team’s stadium was built 3 (or fewer) years prior to the relevant season. Delta
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We prefer to fully avoid data from 2011-12 (the lockout shortened season), and since we
include a control variable calculated based on year t-1 observations, we therefore exclude the
2012-13 season from our sample.

win loss was obtained from basketballreference.com and is defined as a team’s winning
percentage in year t minus their winning percentage in year t-1. Win share measures (OWS and
DWS) are discussed in section 2 above. Based on equation 3, we now formally state the relevant
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 (null hypothesis): 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 . In this case, a profit-maximizing team
would value offensively oriented free agents the same (per unit of production) compared to
defensively oriented free agents. In a NBA labor market where there is an offensive salary
premium, any team (profit-maximizing or win-maximizing) would have an opportunity to
engage in arbitrage by choosing relatively underpaid defensive free agents (and disequilibrium
would exist in the labor market).
Hypothesis 3: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 > 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 . In this case, a profit-maximizing team would value
offensively oriented players more (per unit of production) than defensively oriented free agents.
In an NBA labor market where there is an offensive salary premium, only win-maximizing teams
would have an opportunity to engage in arbitrage (and equilibrium could be present in the NBA
labor market).

3.1 Model Selection
In choosing the econometric model, we first employed a Breusch and Pagan (1980) test
to confirm that a panel model would be preferable to a pooled OLS model. The results
overwhelming rejected the pooled OLS approach. We then implemented the ‘xtoverid’
command in Stata to test whether the coefficients produced by fixed effects and random effects
were the same [Nichols, 2007]. The Sargan-Hansen test statistics from each of our primary

specifications indicated that a fixed effects approach was preferable.5 An article from
Knowledge Base, “In stata, how do I test overidentification using xtoverid?”, discusses how the
‘xtoverid’ command executes the “same approach described by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge
(2002, pp. 290-91).” A Wooldridge (2002) test—using the ‘xtserial’ command in Stata-rejected the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation. To correct for the first order
autocorrelation, we use the fixed effects estimator derived by Baltagi and Wu (1999). Bradbury
(2019) also selected the Baltagi and Wu (1999) fixed effects approach as superior for the same
(above) general reasons.

3.2 Results
Using the approach developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999), we estimate several
specifications and present our results in table 6. Note this approach reduces the number of
observations by 30.

Table 6: Regressions with Yearly Team Revenue as the Dependent Variable

VARIABLES
OWSi,t
DWSi,t
DeltaWLi,t
GDP per capitai,t
Populationi,t

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4

0.572*
(0.306)
0.453
(0.332)

0.923**
(0.421)
1.037**
(0.448)
-19.17
(16.79)
6.341***
(0.984)
6.95e-05***
(2.23e-05)

1.055***
(0.323)
0.887**
(0.348)
-29.68**
(13.42)
-1.267
(1.121)
2.27e-05
(1.71e-05)

0.990***
(0.245)
0.883***
(0.261)
-25.72***
(9.791)
-0.194
(1.244)
2.12e-05
(1.43e-05)

The Hausman (1978) test was not possible since the ‘rank of the differenced variance matrix did
not equal the number of coefficients being tested’ in each of our primary specifications.
5

New Stadiumi,t

8.435
(11.27)

12.36
(8.703)

332.5***
(2.351)

-584.4***
(63.16)

31.59***
(3.259)
-63,559***
(3,901)

164.1***
(48.44)

150
30

150
30

150
30

150
30

y2015
y2016
y2017
y2018
Time Trend
Constant

Observations
Number of Teams

3.594
(6.674)
-35.76***
(3.952)
-43.13***
(4.979)
-14.20**
(5.501)
-11.35***
(4.087)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Of the 4 specifications, Model 3 has the highest (overall) R-squared of 0.49 compared
with (overall) R-squared measures of 0.09, 0.36, and 0.39 from models 1, 2, and 4 (respectively).
The primary variables of interest, 𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 , generally have coefficients close to 1.
Considering Model 3, the estimated marginal revenue product of an offensive win (𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 ) is
$1.055 million whereas the estimated marginal revenue product of a defensive win (𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 )
is $887,000. A Paternoster test of coefficient equality does not reject hypothesis 2 that 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆
= 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 ; a one-sided test produces an associated p-value of 0.36 [see Paternoster et al (1998)
for more information on this test]. Thus, an additional offensive win does not appear to generate
more revenue compared to that of a defensive win. Consequently, in an NBA labor market
where offensively oriented free agents receive higher salaries than defensively oriented free
agents, a profit-maximizing team would be able to engage in arbitrage by allocating more
resources to relatively underpaid defensive free agents (disequilibrium would exist in such a
labor market). In other words, a team (win-maximizing or profit-maximizing) focusing on

signing defensively-oriented players could generate more wins while spending the same total
amount on salaries.
Control variable coefficients generally have the expected sign. GDP per capitai,t and
Populationi,t are both positive and statistically significant in Model 2, although they lose
statistical significance in Models 3 and 4 (once time variables are included).
DeltaWLi,t (team winning percentage in year t minus winning percentage in year t-1) is
negative and statistically significant in Models 3 and 4, suggesting a persistence effect moving
from year t-1 to year t. In other words, if a team had a good year in year t after performing well
in year t-1, revenue is estimated to be more in year t than if they had performed poorly in year t1, ceteris paribus. New Stadiumi,t is positive albeit statistically insignificant. However, since
the proportion of teams in a new stadium (built within the past 3 years) is quite small, this result
is not particularly surprising.

3.3 Accounting for Level of Team Offensive Orientation
As a robustness check, we introduce a new econometric specification as follows:
4) 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where 𝛼1 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 , 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 refers to the actual number of wins for team i in year t and
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is defined as

𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡

, where 𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is defined as the total number of win shares

generated by team i in year t. As 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 increases, a team becomes more offensively
oriented. With the above econometric equation, we can test whether more offensively oriented
teams generate more team revenue, ceteris paribus. Even among mediocre teams, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
can vary widely. To illustrate, the 2014-15 Milwaukee Bucks won 41 (half) of their regular

season games and had a 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 of 0.34, indicating only about one-third of their wins
were generated by offense. Comparatively, the 2015-16 Houston Rockets also won 41 (half) of
their regular season games but had a 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 of 0.63, a figure nearly double that of the
Bucks. Interestingly, offensive juggernaut Houston was 15th in attendance while the defensive
focused Milwaukee was 29th in attendance; similarly, Houston’s revenue ($258 million) nearly
doubled that of Milwaukee’s.6 Hence, our econometric specification tests whether level of
offensive orientation matters in terms of revenue.
The R-squared measures (overall) for the fully specified models were 0.41 for model 3 and
0.43 for model 4. The estimates from table 7 reveal a statistically insignificant relationship
between 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and team revenue, ceteris paribus. In each specification, the standard
errors of the 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 are at least double that of the coefficients, with p-values of at least
0.67. These results strongly suggest a statistically insignificant relationship between
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and team revenue. We can also specify the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 ; in this case, actual wins would
have the same impact on team revenue as do offensive and defensive wins.
Table 7: Regressions with Yearly Team Revenue as the Dependent Variable

VARIABLES
Winsi,t
Proportioni,t
DeltaWLi,t
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(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4

0.517**
(0.200)
7.811
(18.07)

1.085***
(0.331)
-2.102
(20.20)
-26.92

0.968***
(0.243)
6.497
(16.17)
-32.45**

0.998***
(0.193)
4.468
(11.64)
-31.03***

We note a large factor in this comparison is that Houston is a large market while Milwaukee is
a small market.

(17.30)
6.325***
(0.983)
7.26e-05***
(2.23e-05)
8.642
(11.17)

(13.68)
-1.151
(1.115)
2.55e-05
(1.71e-05)
12.35
(8.675)

328.8***
(2.805)

-603.3***
(62.50)

31.16***
(3.237)
-62,719***
(3,873)

125.5***
(46.99)

150
30

150
30

150
30

150
30

GDP per capitai,t
Populationi,t
New Stadiumi,t
y2015
y2016
y2017
y2018
Time Trend
Constant

Observations
Number of Teams

(10.01)
-0.0148
(1.228)
2.52e-05*
(1.42e-05)
3.568
(6.566)
-34.66***
(3.831)
-41.75***
(4.840)
-12.97**
(5.364)
-10.66***
(3.993)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Estimates reveal that a win generates an additional $0.968 million dollars (𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑤𝑖𝑛 ) is very
close to the estimates of 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 from table 6 where 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 =$1.055 million
and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 =$0.887 million. In tests of coefficient equality [Paternoster, 1998], hypothesis 4
(𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 ) could not be rejected, suggesting the marginal
revenue product of an offensive (defensive) win is equivalent to the marginal revenue product of
an actual win. This provides evidence that offensive and defensive win shares have the same
statistical relationship with team revenue as does actual team wins.
Signs and statistical significance of the control variables in table 7 were quite similar to those
from table 6. In order to account for potential non-linearities between team performance and
revenue, we included squared terms for offensive and defensive win shares (equation 4) as well

as a squared term for actual wins (equation 5). These squared terms were not statistically
significant and results are available from the authors upon request.

3.4- Implications and Case Study
In the introduction, we discuss how NBA teams are win-maximizers or profitmaximizers. Most likely, the league has a mix of win and profit maximizers. Our above
econometric results suggest offensive and defensive wins are equally valuable as revenue
generators in the NBA, demonstrating that profit-maximizing teams should value offense at the
same rate as defense on the free agent market. Our conclusion matches Ehrlich et al.’s (2019);
i.e. that win-maximizers should value offense and defense equally.
A case study from the recent free agent market can help articulate these insights. During
the 2019 free agent market, Derrick Rose and T.J. McConnell both signed 2-year contracts with
the Pistons and Pacers, respectively. Both players were point guards coming off seasons with
similar win share totals (3.0 for Rose and 2.9 for McConnell). Even though McConnell was 4
years younger and had a much better health history, Rose signed for $15 million while
McConnell received only $7 million. Since Rose was worth 2.6 offensive win shares the
previous year while McConnell was worth only 1.2 offensive win shares, this illustrates an
offensive premium paid for offensive production as described by Ehrlich et al. (2019). Ehrlich et
al. (2019) would have advised a win-maximizing team to sign the relatively undervalued player
(like McConnell) since doing so would increase the expected number of wins (by freeing up cap
space to sign another win producing player). We would also advise a profit-maximizing team to
focus on a player like McConnell, since defensive production could be purchased more cheaply
(per win) while the marginal revenue product of a defensive win is equivalent to that of an

offensive win. Therefore, the conclusion teams should pay for defense at the same rate as
offense (per unit) applies to both win-maximizing and profit-maximizing teams.78
Thus far, we have shown that profit-maximizing teams should value offensive and
defensive production equally. However, the NBA has a system of revenue sharing that distorts
the revenue generation process since high revenue teams transfer revenue to low revenue teams.
In order to more fully test whether “offense sells tickets,” we take revenue sharing into account
in the next section.
4. Revenue Prior to Revenue Sharing
Since the NBA has a system of revenue sharing, the previous estimations distort the true
preferences of fans. For example, the fan spending generated by an additional win by the Lakers
is not entirely retained by the Lakers. Instead, the league’s revenue sharing policy dictates that
large market teams like the Lakers distribute some of their fan’s spending to small revenue
teams. In order to obtain marginal revenue product estimates reflecting true fan spending (i.e.
preferences), then the correct revenue measure would be revenue prior to sharing. Thus, we
model pre-sharing revenue by assuming the NBA operates a straight 50% pool plan. This
approach is similar to the Major League Baseball pre-revenue sharing models of Rockerbie and
Easton (2018) and Ehrlich and Potter (2020). First, we note that for the league:
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Through the first half of their contracts (from a season shortened by COVID-19), McConnell
(3.4 WS, 1.7 OWS, 1.7 DWS) has outperformed Rose (2.5 WS, 1.8 OWS, 0.7 DWS). However,
McConnell’s salary is less than half that of Rose’s. Rose has still been offensive oriented and
McConnell has still been defensive oriented.
8
Using Forbes revenue data, Berri et al (2015) also find that marginal revenue product estimates
for NBA players are smaller than what they are actually paid in the free agent market. They use
a bargaining model to explain this result. Since we are analyzing the difference between
𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 , it is beyond the scope of our current study to explain the difference
between estimated marginal revenue products and observed salaries.

30
𝑃𝑟𝑒
(∑30
)
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 ) = (∑𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖

6)

Where 𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 is team i’s revenue (pre-sharing) in year t and 𝑅𝑖 is team i’s revenue (post-sharing).
In other words, equation 6 states total league revenue is equivalent pre- and post-sharing.
For team i:
1

𝑃𝑟𝑒
) = 𝑅𝑖
0.5𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 + 0.5 (30) (∑30
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖

7)

Where 0.5 is the proportion of each team’s revenue (pre-sharing) that goes to the league’s pool
where the total amount of the pool is then dispersed equally between each team.

Substituting:
1

0.5𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 + 0.5 (30) (∑30
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 ) = 𝑅𝑖

8)

This substitution is necessary in order to calculate pre-revenue sharing for team i with observable
Forbes data.

Rearranging:
𝑅𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒 =

1
30

𝑅𝑖 −0.5( )(∑30
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 )
0.5

9)

Equation 9 allows us to estimate each team’s revenue (pre-sharing) with the (postsharing) revenue available from Forbes. This equation represents a situation wherein a league
has a 50% straight pool plan. Such a plan has the largest revenue teams (those above the mean)
paying in and the smallest teams (those below the mean) receiving from the pool.

Our assumption that revenue sharing is a 50% straight pool plan fits well with several
features from the actual CBA agreement. According to Coon (1999-2020), “the concept behind
the plan is that teams contribute an equal percentage of their total revenues into a common pool
(adjusted for certain expenses such as arena expenses), then receive an allocation equal to a 1/30
share of the pool.” Each team’s total revenues are calculated through what the CBA defines as
Basketball Related Income (BRI). Although BRI is likely highly correlated with the revenue
figures produced by Forbes, the numbers are not the same. Furthermore, per team BRI figures
are unavailable to researchers. Thus, we use the Forbes data to estimate team revenue prior to
revenue sharing, since actual monetary transfer between teams is determined by the unobserved
team BRI figures. There are also a number of exceptions in how funds are distributed via the
pool [Coon, 1999-2020]. However, we unable to include these exceptions in our model of
revenue (pre-sharing) due to data limitations.
In determining the amount of BRI paid to players, the two most recent CBAs (2011,
2017) have a stipulation that the player’s share of Basketball Related Income is a band from
49%-51% [Aldridge, 2016]. However, Coon (1999-2020) also writes that players are guaranteed
50% of the league’s projected BRI for the upcoming year, “plus (or minus) 60.5% of the amount
by which revenues exceed (or fall short of) the forecasts, with a lower limit of 49% of BRI and
an upper limit of 51% of BRI.” Since the percentage paid by each team to the league wide
revenue sharing pool [Coon, 1999-2020] is determined by the amount paid to player salaries
(between 49% and 51%), we use the midpoint (50%) as the amount contributed to the pool by
each team for our estimation of yearly team pre-revenue sharing revenue. Table 8 presents
summary statistics of both the Forbes revenue figures (post-revenue) and our own estimates of
pre-revenue sharing revenue.

Table 8: Revenue Summary Statistics
Revenue
Pre-Sharing
Revenue

Obs
180
180

Mean
230.683
230.683

St. Dev
71.686
119.389

25th
166.891
144.509

Median
223.205
199.549

75th
268.847
281.323

Figure 4 illustrates the distributions of post-revenue sharing revenue and pre-revenue
sharing revenue. By definition, the means (the dotted line) of each distribution are equivalent.
However, the pre-revenue sharing revenue distribution shows more dispersion than the postrevenue sharing revenue distribution.

Figure 4: Kernel Density Plots Comparing Distributions Before and After Revenue Sharing

Figure 5 illustrates the team-by-team before-and-after process of revenue sharing from
2018-2019. The pre-revenue sharing histogram is noticeably more dispersed than the postrevenue sharing histogram.

Figure 5: Comparison of Team Revenue Before and After Revenue Sharing during the 2018-19
NBA Season

Our a priori assumption is that a win is more valuable pre-revenue sharing. Our econometric
models:
𝑝𝑟𝑒
10) 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

𝑝𝑟𝑒
11) 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

These are the same econometric models specified in section 3, except pre-revenue sharing
𝑝𝑟𝑒
revenue (𝑅𝑖,𝑡
) is the dependent variable instead of post-revenue sharing revenue (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ). In
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
regards to equation 10, 𝛽1 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝛽2 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and variables 𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (𝑂𝑊𝑆𝑖,𝑡 )
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠
represent team offensive (defensive) win shares. For equation 11, 𝛼1 = 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡

is the (actual) number of team wins in a given season. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the fraction of team win
shares deriving from offense. We now form the following hypotheses:
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
Hypothesis 5: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
= 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
. In this case, fan preferences for offensive and defensive

wins would be (statistically) equivalent.
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
Hypothesis 6: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
> 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
. In this case, fans would have a preference for offensive

wins compared to defensive wins (prior to revenue sharing).
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝐷𝑊𝑆
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠
Hypothesis 7: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
= 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
= 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
. In this case, actual team

wins would have an equivalent impact on revenue as offensive (defensive) wins.
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
Hypothesis 8: 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 < 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 < 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
; economic research has found

that revenue sharing acts like a tax on the value of wins [see Leeds et al. (2018, 135) and Solow

and Krautmann (2007)]; therefore, we expect a priori that post-revenue sharing coefficients
would be larger than pre-revenue sharing coefficients.

Table 9: Regression Results with Pre-Revenue Sharing Revenue as the Dependent Variable.

(1)
Model 1

VARIABLES
OWSi,t

(2)
Model 2

2.054***
(0.532)
1.781***
(0.569)

DWSi,t
Winsi,t

-55.77**
(21.61)
-1.759
(2.081)
4.10e-05
(2.92e-05)
16.79
(14.30)
33.38***
(6.340)

1.963***
(0.409)
11.74
(25.97)
-63.49***
(22.07)
-1.543
(2.070)
4.71e-05
(2.92e-05)
16.93
(14.18)
32.56***
(6.305)

-67,281***
(6,211)

-65,684***
(6,127)

150
30

150
30

Proportioni,t
DeltaWLi,t
GDP per capitai,t
Populationi,t
New stadiumi,t
Time Trend

Constant

Observations
Number of Teams

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Both models have the same R-squared (0.46).9 Using (estimated) pre-revenue sharing
revenue in the above regressions provides a better estimate of true fan preferences (in terms of
their spending) compared to models using post-revenue sharing revenue (tables 6 and 7). From
the first specification, the estimated marginal revenue product of an offensive win (2.054) is
slightly larger than that of a defensive win (1.781); a Paternoster test does not reject hypothesis 5
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
that 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
=𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
(with a p-value of 0.35 in a one-sided test). Hence, fans do not appear

to have a clear preference for offense.
𝑊𝑖𝑛
Considering hypothesis 7, Model 2 produces a 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
estimate that is not statistically
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
different from 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
in Paternoster (1998) tests for coefficient equality [with p-

values of at least 0.79 in each (two-sided) test]. This supports the notion that actual team wins
have an equivalent impact (in a statistical sense) on pre-revenue sharing revenue as do offensive
and defensive win shares. Furthermore, the coefficient for 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is not statistically
significant (0.70 p-value) in model 2, demonstrating that level of offensive production, ceteris
paribus, does not statistically influence pre-revenue sharing revenue.
𝑂𝑊𝑆
𝐷𝑊𝑆
Estimates for 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
from table 9 (regression 1) are roughly double that

of post-revenue sharing estimates for 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 and 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝐷𝑊𝑆 from table 6 (regression 3).
𝑂𝑊𝑆
Considering hypothesis 8, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
is statistically significant and larger than 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑊𝑆 (with a
𝐷𝑊𝑆
p-value of 0.05 in a one-sided Paternoster test). Similarly, 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
is statistically significant
𝐷𝑊𝑆
and larger than 𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒
(p-value of 0.09 in a one-sided test). Thus, wins are shown to be more

9

We also estimated the same specifications as tables 6 and 7 from section 3, although we only
report the specifications with the highest R-squareds in table 9. Full results are available from
the authors upon request.

valuable in the absence of revenue sharing. In other words, revenue sharing acts like a ‘tax’ on
winning.
One final observation is that the controls from table 9 have similar signs and statistical
significance as do tables 6 and 7. A noticeable difference is that the DeltaWLi,t coefficients from
the pre-revenue sharing regressions are about twice the size (in absolute value) as the postrevenue sharing regressions.

5. Conclusion

Using Forbes revenue data and team offensive and defensive win shares, we find no
statistical difference between the marginal revenue product of an offensive win compared with
that of a defensive win. We confirm these findings both before and after revenue sharing.
Therefore, we conclude that fans do not prefer offense to defense in terms of their spending.
Implications for profit-maximizing team decision makers are clear: offensive production
should be compensated at the same rate as defensive production. Our results are particularly
interesting given that Ehrlich et al. (2019) demonstrate teams compensate offensive production
roughly 150% more than defensive production in the NBA (in terms of salaries). Ehrlich et al.
(2019) point out win-maximizing teams should also pay for offensive production at the same rate
as defensive production. Thus, in an efficient market, we would expect the equilibrium price for
offensive and defensive production to be equal (per unit). Coupled with the findings of Ehrlich
et al (2019), our current results suggest disequilibrium in the NBA labor market. Future
researchers should continue studying the NBA labor market in order to confirm (or disprove) the
offensive premium discovered by Ehrlich et al. (2019).
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